LOCAL
GOVERNANCE PROJECT
A Framework for a Devolved Local Government System in Zimbabwe
A DISCUSSION PAPER
CONTENTS
1.0 Introduction
2.0 Structure of Provincial Councils
3.0 Powers of Provincial and Central
Government
4.0 Funding for Provincial Councils
5.0 Relationship between Central Government
and Provincial Councils
6.0 Conclusion
Appendix A
Local Governance Project
1.0 Introduction
Zimbabwe
is a unitary state that has devolved power to its ten provinces. Devolution of
power was inserted as a compromise into the new Zimbabwe constitution by
popular demand, especially through relentless advocacy of civil society
organizations and residents’ associations. Of course, two of the three
political parties that negotiated the new constitution had adopted devolution
as one of their cornerstone to local governance.
While the constitutional provision
for devolution of power to the provinces is salutary and a major victory for
all progressive democratic forces advocating for equal access and distribution
of national resources, transparency and sustainable people-centered
development; the victory could turn out to be pyrrhic. Why and how could this
be so? It is because the actual provisions of devolution of power remain
undefined and subject to an Act of Parliament yet to be crafted and passed. The
Act will either grant effective power to the provinces thus enabling the
success of devolution or curtail it hence consigning devolution of power to a
stillbirth in Zimbabwe. The latter possibility may be avoided because the
political structures of the provincial councils are already in place and would
be instrumental in framing legislative and executive powers to be bestowed on
them by the Act of Parliament.
The
reality that currently elected legislators shall define the nature, scope and
extent of devolution of power to the provinces offers very real opportunities
for participatory and stakeholder in put in crafting the Act of Parliament on
Devolution of Power. It is against this backdrop that this framework on
devolution is drafted in order to be the reference and guide towards a
participative crafting of real devolution of power in Zimbabwe. This framework
highlights and raises major concerns for debate by stakeholders in all the ten
provinces; the concerns that legislators would not be unwise to overlook when
debating the Bill on devolution of power.
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KEY CONCERNS
- Ensuring
effective, efficient and corruption-free local government administrative
- Ensuring a
participative and responsive local governance system that brings
citizens closer to decision-making
- Ensuring
adequate legal safeguards for sufficient resourcing for provincial
governance systems
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1.2 Objectives
- To
initiate a participatory, citizens and stakeholders driven process of
framing the form and content of devolution
- To
ensure that devolution of power embodies principles of active citizens
participation, transparency and accountability
1.3 The architecture and design of devolution
shall include:
- The
levels of Government
- The
geographic units of governance
- The
distribution of functions and responsibilities of provincial councils
- The
allocation of resources
- The
institutions of governance
- Relationships
between central government and provincial councils
2.0 STRUCTURE OF PROVINCIAL COUNCILS
It
is imperative to observe that the devolved provincial structure is not a new
structure or additional tier in local government in Zimbabwe. The defining
feature of the devolved provincial councils should therefore be more and
effective power at their disposal to ensure sustainable development and
efficient service delivery system. Since the local governance system in the
country has been managed through several Acts, it is crucial to note how these
Acts add value or subtract it in the envisaged Act of Parliament on Devolution
of power to provinces.
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ACTS ADMINISTERING LOCAL
GOVERNMENT
I.
Provincial Councils and Administration Act
II.
The Regional Town and Country Planning Act
III.
The Urban Council Act
IV.
The Rural District Councils Act
V.
The Traditional Leaders Act
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2.1.1 The Provincial Council [excluding metropolitans]
consists of:
i.
Provincial
Chairperson
ii.
All
MPs and Senators from the province
iii.
Two
senator chiefs from the province
iv.
All
mayors and chairpersons from urban and rural local authorities in the province
v.
Ten
persons elected through proportional representation
2.1.2 The Metropolitan Councils [Bulawayo & Harare]
consist of:
i.
City
Mayor becomes the Metropolitan Chairperson
ii.
For
Harare, deputy chairperson is mayor of second largest urban local authority
iii.
All
MPs and Senators from the province
iv.
All
mayors and deputy mayors and all chairpersons and deputy chairpersons from
local authorities within the metropolitan province.
2.1.3 Powers of the Provincial / Metropolitan
Councils
i.
The
provincial council constitutes a provincial parliament and therefore should
have legislative powers
ii.
The
Provincial council should have an executive arm answerable to the provincial
council
2.1.4 Composition of the Provincial Executive Committee
The
provincial executive committee shall be the executive arm of the provincial
council and shall consist of the following;
i.
Provincial
Chairperson or Metropolitan Mayor as head of executive arm
ii.
A
minimum of five executive portfolio holders selected by the head from amongst
members of the provincial council.
iii.
Gender
balance should be considered in selection of portfolios holders
2.1.5 Provincial Council Employees
i.
The
day to day running of provincial council work shall be done by the secretariat led
by the Provincial Administrator.
ii.
The
provincial administrator shall be a senior civil servant appointed by the
public service commission from names presented by the provincial chairperson or
metropolitan mayor.
iii.
Terms
of contract shall be the same as that of permanent secretaries
iv.
The
provincial administrator shall chair the provincial development committee and
presents its findings to the provincial executive committee.
2.1.6 Composition of provincial development committee
i.
Provincial
administrator as chairperson
ii.
Heads
of line ministries in the province
iii.
District
administrators in the province
iv.
Heads
of civil society organizations in the province
v.
Town
clerks, town secretaries, local board secretaries in the province
vi.
Captains
of industry and commerce in the province
vii.
Heads
of public institutions in the province
3.0 POWERS OF PROVINCIAL AND CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
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CURRENT POWERS OF CENTRAL
GOVERNMENT
1.
Establish, abolish or alter local
government status
2.
Fix area of local authorities [eg.
Number of wards and thus councilors]
3.
Approve the taking over of land by the
local authority
4.
Carry out planning and estate
development
5.
Appoint the Local Government Board
6.
Appoint a Valuation Board
7.
Appoint Auditors
8.
Appoint investigating team when an
enquiry is needed
9.
Suspend or dismiss councilors who have
committed serious offences
10. Appoint
a commissioner to run the affairs of a council when there are no councilors
11. Give
general direction on policy
12. Authorize
anything not covered by the Act
13. Publish
model by-laws, direct councils to adopt specific by-laws and
14. Suspend
a council resolution when it goes against the interests of residents
15. Correct
any omissions
16. Establish
bus stops
17. Regulate
accounting and loans
18. Prescribe
amounts beyond which councils should seek tenders
19. Approve
income generating projects and cooperatives
20. Direct
councils to pay their debts and reduce deficits
21. State
what types of local charges can be raised without approval
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PROPOSED POWERS OF DEVOLVED PROVINCIAL COUNCILS
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
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4.0 FUNDING FOR PROVINCIAL COUNCILS
4.1. Background information
Inadequate
funding for local governments has remained the greatest challenge to their
service delivery role in Zimbabwe. Unless properly addressed in the devolved
system, the provincial councils could easily succumb to the same malaise and
thus render the devolution concept unworkable. It is ironic that local authorities
are supposed to get revenue from their social service delivery activities like
the provision of water, refuse removal and provision of basic health services
as examples; the very social service delivery that are grossly underfunded.
In
theory, local authorities, especially urban councils are empowered to engage in
commercial, industrial and agricultural activities to raise funds. This is in
addition to revenue from rates from property and land, penalties and fines,
license fees, supplementary charges and fees charged from various users of
council amenities like schools, flea markets or bus termini. Due to
undercharging rates that are below commercial ones, local authorities have
continually failed to recoup actual costs incurred in service provision. This
is partly explained by failure to make appropriate and periodic valuations on
the one hand while on the other it is the central government’s interference
through approving council budgets and fixing certain charges and fees payable
by the users. Of course there is always the reality of the low income by
ratepayers themselves that has to be borne in mind when considering
affordability.
The
net effect is that local governments have continually been underfunded and thus
impacting negatively on social services delivery. Fundraising projects like
farming or liquor manufacturing and marketing have often been poorly run and
yielding losses after losses and thus drawing more money from councils instead
of bringing in revenue. Currently most councils have rented out these
industrial and commercial activities. Revenue from social service delivery has
been inadequate and unreliable since uneconomic rates are charged and
ratepayers are most often in arrears and defaulting payment. Funding from
central government remains the main hope for survival of local authorities.
In reality, central government
support for local governments has been dismal for the last decade or so. The
main support from central government has been in the form of loans under the
Public Sector Investment Programme [PSIP] and grants for public health. But
these disbursements have largely been unpredictable and inconsistent not to
mention delays. Because transfers came late as re-imbursements of costs already
incurred when the disbursements were inadequate it therefore meant that local
authorities were in essence subsidizing central government. This has been
prevalent in the health services where councils should recoup 50 % from central
government and most often they do not. What this means in effect is that
central government’s failure to own up to its mandates is transferred to be the
burden of local authorities who already have their own mandates choked by
underfunding and charging of uneconomic rates. Social service delivery suffers
and development programs stall and stagnant.
4.2 Streamlining Responsibilities and Resource Allocation
Since
the call for devolution of power to the provinces was motivated by among other
things the desire for equitable distribution of opportunities and resources and
the need for sustainable people-oriented development; it is imperative that
resource allocation mechanisms be addressed. Resource allocation should be in
line with responsibilities accorded to central government or provincial council
or local authority, as the case may be. Devolution by its nature transfers
power to lower tiers of governance and in this case to provincial councils and
urban or rural district councils. In essence it means giving more power
hitherto enjoyed by central government through especially ministry of local
government to provincial councils and local authorities. The transferred powers
and responsibilities should by constitutional right go with appropriate control
of financial resources.
Central
government should play only supervisory role in those areas it would have
devolved power to provincial councils and local authorities. A few examples
here are necessary. On health services delivery, normally the Ministry of
Health reimburses 50% of costs met by local authorities. That means the other
50% is borne by local authorities from their other sources therefore distorting
revenue utilization. The control of and distribution and charging for water use
by ZINWA for instance compels local authorities to be customers to the Ministry
of water and lose control of such a crucial commodity as water. Similarly,
ministries for education should not shoulder rehabilitation and maintenance of
schools to local authorities while ministries monopolize policy and
decision-making on educational matters.
Areas
like water resources, health, education and housing are very crucial for
provincial and local governments as citizens expect the best services from
these immediate and lower tiers of government. It is imperative that in
streamlining responsibilities and powers the provinces get full control of
these key social service delivery areas.
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Powers to be wholly devolved to provinces
should include:
- Water
management
- Health
services
- Education
- Housing
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4.3. Revenue from Natural Resources
In
principle, Zimbabweans are agreed that natural resources should benefit the
whole nation in general and in particular the local community where such
resource is found. The sorry state of underdevelopment in resource-rich
communities became the rallying point for devolution in Zimbabwe. It was
expected and logically so, that exploitation of locally found resources should
bear tangible fruits to locals before such fruits are enjoyed elsewhere. This
does not only make sense politically but morally as well.
Mineral
resources are perhaps the main concern by most communities in Zimbabwe. Apart
from mineral resources like gold, platinum, diamonds, iron ore, coal or
asbestos to mention just a few, communities are also endowed with wildlife,
woodlands, water, sand etc. Huge profits are realized for instance from hunting
concessions and timber logging as examples. The control and benefits from
exploitation of such resources should be enjoyed at local level, provincial
level and nationally by creating a predetermined ratio of sharing whatever
revenue in taxes is received from such activities.
The sharing of benefits among
central government, provincial council and respective local authorities should
not be in monetary terms only. It should be borne in mind that the issue of
employment of locals has remained a burning issue and one of the motivating
factors for the call for devolution. The three tiers of government should also
agree on investment and job opportunities as well as corporate responsibilities
deriving from natural resources exploitation. What this implies is that
contracts negotiations and concession granting can no longer be the monopoly of
central government in a devolved system. In any case, transparency in contracts
agreed with mining companies for example ensures increased revenue for the
nation for exploitation of its natural resources and holding mining companies
accountable for impact on the environment and hence livelihoods of surrounding
communities.
4.3
Revenue from Central Government
Since
devolution does not absolve central government from its responsibilities to
citizens, financial support from treasury should actually increase to the
provinces. Devolution is not an end in itself but a means to an end which is
sustainable and equitable development of Zimbabwe. Through provincial councils,
the state of Zimbabwe is bringing development decision-making closer to the
people and to make that development meaningful to all citizens. More financial
allocations should go to provinces to ensure that needs of provincial councils are
met from the national budget.
For
instance, certain revenue from taxation should be divided between the
provincial council and central government without first having everything
getting to treasury then distributed very late to the needy areas. Beitbridge
as a port brings sizeable revenue to the country yet the local authority in
Beitbridge has very little to show from such revenue flows. Therefore, it is
not only how much treasury disburses to provinces but the administration of
those disbursement. Development projects have in the past been stalled due to
bureaucratic niceties from ministry of finance and respective line ministries.
Lastly,
central government should cease to control directly or indirectly local
authorities’ activities that could be supervised by provincial councils. For
example, approval for councils to borrow or enter into similar transactions
should not necessarily be approved by the minister of local government if such
transactions are acceptable to the ministry of finance. The excessive executive
interference in local governance should be removed because of its stifling of
development initiatives. Regulatory powers over urban councils and rural
district councils should now reside with provincial councils which should be
answerable to the Parliament of Zimbabwe.
- Relationships between central government and provincial
councils
The relationship between central government and
provincial councils is of interest and would demonstrate Zimbabwe’s maturity in
constitutionalism and the rule of law or the lack of them thereof. Why is this
so? The very inclusion of devolution of power in the new Zimbabwe Constitution
[Chapter 14] itself speaks volumes about public perceptions of central
government strong grip on local government. Perhaps the devolution issue is the
single most important improvement in the constitution that can radically change
the architecture and culture of governance in the country. It is a direct means
of bringing government closer to the people and hence improving accountability
and transparency.
Since devolution is not an ideology that any political
party or group of people can claim as theirs, the inclusion of devolution
however came about after protracted advocacy and negotiations before and during
the constitution-making. Its inclusion is of course credited to the two parties
out of three that led the writing of the new constitution but in essence it was
people-powered choice. As if to mark permanently the importance of devolution,
it is mentioned in the preamble of the constitution and Chapter 14 on
provincial and local government has a preamble too. It is perhaps the only
chapter with a preamble. The preamble emphasizes national unity, democratic
participation and equitable allocation of resources. Most notable is ‘the participation of local communities in
the determination of development priorities within their areas.’
5.2 Objectives of devolving power
to provinces
According to
Chapter 14, Part 1, 264 (2), the objectives of devolution of governmental
powers and responsibilities include;
(a) To give powers of local governance to the
people and enhance their participation in the exercise of the powers of the
State and in making decisions affecting them;
(b) To promote
democratic, effective, transparent, accountable and coherent government in
Zimbabwe as a whole;
(c) To preserve and
foster the peace, national unity and indivisibility of Zimbabwe;
(d) To recognize the
right of communities to manage their own affairs and to further their
development;
(e) To ensure the
equitable sharing of local and national resources; and
(f)
To transfer responsibilities and resources
from the national government in order to establish a sound financial base for
each provincial and metropolitan council and local authority
This background substantiated from the constitution
itself is crucial in determining the relationship between central government
and provincial/metropolitan councils. The traditional hierarchical relationship
between central and local governments which allowed for constant interference
on the affairs of latter by the former has fundamentally changed. Previously
local authorities were appendages of the Ministry of Local Government if not
the Minister and performed their responsibilities on behalf of the Ministry.
Now some power and responsibilities have to be transferred and not delegated to
the provincial and metropolitan councils.
Central
government through its ministry responsible for local government should adjust
to the new constitutional dispensation that certain sizeable powers and
responsibilities are exercised elsewhere. For example, supervision of local
government becomes largely a duty of provincial or metropolitan councils where
a three tier level of government operates. The ministerial approval of council
budgets, or imposition of by-laws or varying council decisions should be
scrapped altogether in the Act of Parliament.
The very composition of provincial councils by elected
legislators who also seat at the National Assembly and Upper House demonstrate
that the provincial councils are not lesser than but parts of the legislature
at local levels. It confirms the transfer of powers and responsibilities as
opposed to delegation of duties by ministry to its local functionaries.
Central government should have specified roles that
must co-exist and be in harmony with roles of provincial councils. However,
ministerial directives should not directly go to local authorities by-passing
provincial councils.
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Central Government Should Not
Interfere in:
i.
Water and sewerage management
ii.
Education at provincial level
iii.
Health
iv.
Housing
v.
Tourism
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5.3 Resolution of Disputes
In the likely event of disputes between central
government and provincial councils and local authorities, the Act of Parliament
must provide for resolution through the constitutional court. In disputes that
threaten to alter the powers and responsibilities of any level of government,
it would be advisable that there be a clause allowing for a referendum within
the affected province to decide the matter.
- CONCLUSION
The key highlights are the powers and responsibilities
transferred to the provincial and metropolitan councils, the structure of the
provincial or metropolitan councils in relation to the structure and powers of
the provincial civil service and its terms of reference, funding of provincial
and local government as well as resolution of disputes with central government.
All these highlights should be borne in mind against the background of the very
causes and motivation behind devolving power to provinces and local government.
In essence the spirit behind devolution is democratic participation by the
citizens in governance and development initiatives that affect their
communities. It is to ensure equitable and just distribution and sharing of
opportunities and resources to all. It is to ensure accountability and
transparency in political, economic and governance issues. Above all it aims to
enhance national unity and promotion of patriotism amongst all Zimbabwean
citizens.
Since the objectives and rationale for
devolving power to provinces is no longer in dispute or an issue for debate,
the concern and general preoccupation by the public and all stakeholders should
be on how these lofty and progressive ideals are realized through setting up
workable and transparent legislative and administrative structures. It is
paramount that since democracy and devolution are people-driven programs for
inclusive and sustainable development the citizens’ views are taken into
account at all stages. This document therefore serves as a guide to the debates
and deliberations on various aspects that would exercise the minds of many as
Chapter 14 of the new Constitution is operationalized through the necessary
pieces of legislation.
APPENDIX: A
QUESTIONS
TO GUIDE STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATIONS IN PROVINCES
On
Democratic Governance
1. What must be done to ensure citizens’
participation in local governance?
2. Should there be public budget consultations
by Provincial and local councils?
3. If Yes, how should budget consultations be
done?
4. What mechanisms should be put in place to
ensure citizens’ views are incorporated in the budget process?
5. How can councils be made more accountable to
ratepayers?
6. What should be the role of residents’
association and civic organizations in local governance?
7. Should NGOs perform duties that should be
done by provincial and local councils?
8. What must be done to ensure the following
interests groups are heard by Provincial Authorities
(i)
Women
voices?
(ii)
Youths
voices
(iii)
People
living with disabilities?
9. What mechanisms should be put in place for
citizens to have recourse to in the event unpopular and unprogressive laws and
policies are passed by provincial and or local councils.
10. Other than the two senator chiefs which other
unelected representatives should be included in the provincial councils and
why?
Re-Alignment
of Legislation
11. What aspects of Urban Councils Act do you
think needs adjustment in light of new constitutional dispensation? Or
12. What aspects of the Rural Districts Councils
Act do you think needs adjustment in light of the new constitutional dispensation?
Or
13. What aspects of the Traditional Leaders Act
do you think needs adjustment in light of the new constitutional dispensation?
14. What other laws do you feel should be changed
to enhance effective devolution of powers and responsibilities to provincial and
local government.
Powers
of Provincial/Metropolitan Councils
15. With reference to powers traditionally
enjoyed by central government over local government which ones do you think
should be transferred to provincial/metropolitan councils? [refer to #3 for the
list]
16. Which other additional powers should
provincial councils have?
17. How should disagreements between central and
provincial or local governments be addressed? [eg. Through ministerial
dismissal of councils and appointment of unelected commissioners?]
Administration
of Provincial/Metropolitan Councils
18. Who should head the provincial or
metropolitan administration?
19. How should the senior executives of
provincial/metropolitan councils be recruited?
20. How should the senior executives be
remunerated? [eg. council executives have bought luxury cars when services are
declining]
21. Which committees should provincial councils
have?
22. What mechanisms should be put in place to
ensure that the provincial development plans are funded and implemented?
23. Should there be a provincial development
committee?
24. If Yes, who should be part of the provincial
development committee?
Resource
Allocation and Funding
25. What percentage of revenue generated in the
province should be retained for development in that particular province?
26. What should be treasury’s allocation to
provinces? And why?
27. Who should pay for the provincial councilors?
And why?
28. Which sources of revenue and taxes should be
for central government? Provincial Councils? And local authorities?
29. How much financial autonomy should provincial
councils have?
General
Issues
30. Should provinces be allowed special taxes
peculiar to that province?
31. Should there be salary and benefits
differentiation amongst provinces?
32. What powers should provinces have on civil
service within their jurisdiction? NB some provinces have complained of
underemployment of their citizens.
33. Should educational and language policies be
determined by provinces? Why?
34. Should a province be allowed to hold a
referendum on an issue affecting it?
35. How should provincial geographic adjustments
be done and by whom? Eg. Metropolitan wishes to annex an adjacent town or
simply needs more land for settlement?
36. Should provincial chairpersons and
metropolitan mayors be elected directly by the citizens or indirectly through
political parties? Advantages and Disadvantages of each?
37. Which powers [portfolios] should be devolved
to provinces?
38. Should provinces have some judicial powers?
39. Should provinces have limited control over
the police?
40. Should teacher training and deployment be
shared between central government and provincial councils?
41. Which other services provided by central
government that provinces should have a say?
